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Abstract
We resolve the complexity of revenue-optimal deterministic auctions in the unit-demand single-buyer
Bayesian setting, i.e., the optimal item pricing problem, when the buyer’s values for the items are inde-
pendent. We show that the problem of computing a revenue-optimal pricing can be solved in polynomial
time for distributions of support size 2, and its decision version is NP-complete for distributions of sup-
port size 3. We also show that the problem remains NP-complete for the case of identical distributions.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following natural pricing scenario: We have a set of n items for sale and a single unit-demand
buyer, i.e., a consumer interested in obtaining at most one of the items. The goal of the seller is then to set
prices for the items in order to maximize her revenue by exploiting stochastic information about the buyer’s
preferences. More specifically, the seller is given access to a distribution F from which the buyer’s valua-
tions v = (v1, . . . , vn) for the items are drawn, i.e., v ∼ F , and wants to assign a price pi to each item in
order to maximize her expected revenue. We assume, as is commonly the case, that the buyer here is quasi-
linear, i.e., her utility for item i ∈ [n] is vi − pi, and she will select an item with the maximum nonnegative
utility or nothing if no such item exists. This is known as the Bayesian Unit-demand Item-Pricing Problem
(BUPP) [CHK07], and has received considerable attention in the CS literature during the past few years
[GHK+05, CHK07, Bri08, CHMS10, CD11, DDT12b].
Throughout this paper we focus on the well-studied case [CHK07, CHMS10, CD11] that F = ×ni=1Fi
is a product distribution, i.e., the valuations of the buyer for the items are mutually independent random
variables. We assume that the n (marginal) distributions Fi are discrete and are known to the seller (i.e., the
values of the support and the corresponding probabilities are rational numbers given explicitly in the input).
This seemingly simple computational problem appears to exhibit a very rich structure. Prior to our work,
even the (very special) case that the distributions Fi have support 2 was not well understood: First note that
the search space is apparently exponential, since the support size of F is 2n. What makes things trickier is
that the optimal prices are not necessarily in the support of F (see [CD11] for a simple example with two
items with distributions of support 2). So, a priori, it was not even clear whether the optimal prices can be
described with polynomially many bits in the size of the input description.
Revenue-optimal pricing is well-studied by economists (see, e.g., [Wil96] for a survey and [MMW89]
for a simple additive case with two items). The pricing problem studied in this work fits in the general
framework of optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design, a central question in mathematical economics
(see [MV07] and references therein). Finding the optimal deterministic mechanism in our setting is equiv-
alent to finding the optimal item-pricing. A randomized mechanism, on the other hand, would allow the
seller to price lotteries over items [BCKW10, CMS10], albeit this may be less natural in this context.
Optimal mechanism design is well-understood in single-parameter settings for which Myerson [Mye81]
gives a closed-form characterization for the optimal mechanism. Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg [CHK07]
show that techniques from Myerson’s work can be used to obtain an analogous closed-form characterization
(and also an efficient algorithm) for pricing in our setting, albeit with a constant factor loss in the revenue. In
particular, they obtain a factor 3 approximation to the optimal expected revenue (subsequently improved to
2 in [CHMS10]). Cai and Daskalakis [CD11] obtain a polynomial-time approximation scheme for distribu-
tions with monotone hazard-rate (and a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme for the broader class
of regular distributions). That is, prior to this work, closed-form characterizations (and efficient algorithms)
were known for approximately optimal pricing. The question of whether such a characterization exists for
the optimal pricing has remained open and was posed as an open problem in these works [CHK07, CD11].
Our Results. In this paper, we take a principled complexity-theoretic look at the BUPP with independent
(discrete) distributions. We start by showing (Theorem 1) that the general decision problem is in NP (and as
a corollary, the optimal prices can be described with polynomially many bits). We note that the membership
proof is non-trivial because the optimal prices may not be in the support. Our proof proceeds by partitioning
the space of price-vectors into a set of (exponentially many) cells (defined by the value distributions Fi),
so that the optimal revenue within each cell can be found efficiently by a shortest path computation. One
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consequence of the analysis is that the optimal pricing problem has the integrality property: if the values in
the supports are integer then the optimal prices are also integer (though they may not belong to the support).
We then proceed to show (Theorem 2) that the case in which each marginal distribution has support at
most 2 can be solved in polynomial time. Indeed, by exploiting the underlying structure of the problem, we
show that it suffices to consider O(n2) price-vectors to compute the optimal revenue in this case.
Our main result is that the problem is NP-hard, even for distributions of support 3 (Theorem 3) or dis-
tributions that are identical but have large support (Theorem 4). This answers an open problem first posed
in [CHK07] and also asked in [CD11, DDT12b]. The main difficulty in the reductions stems from the fact
that, for a general instance of the pricing problem, the expected revenue is a highly complex nonlinear func-
tion of the prices. The challenge is to construct an instance such that the revenue can be well-approximated
by a simple function and is also general enough to encode an NP-hard problem.
Previous Work. We have already mentioned the main algorithmic works for the independent distributions
case with approximately-optimal revenue guarantees [CHK07, CHMS10, CD11]. On the lower bound side,
Guruswami et al. [GHK+05] and subsequently Briest [Bri08] studied the complexity of the problem when
the buyer’s values for the items are correlated, respectively obtaining APX-hardness and Ω(nǫ) inapprox-
imability, for some constant ǫ > 0. More recently, Daskalakis, Deckelbaum and Tzamos [DDT12b] showed
that the pricing problem with independent distributions is SQRT-SUM-hard when either the support values
or the probabilities are irrational. We note that their reduction relies on the fact that, for certain carefully
constructed instances, it is SQRT-SUM-hard to compare the revenue of two price-vectors. This has no bear-
ing on the complexity of the problem under the standard discrete model we consider, for which the exact
revenue of a price-vector can be computed efficiently.
Related Work. The optimal mechanism design problem (i.e., the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing
mechanism in a Bayesian setting) has received considerable attention in the CS community during the past
few years. The vast majority of the work so far is algorithmic [CHK07, CHMS10, BGGM10, Ala11, DFK11,
HN12, CDW12a, CDW12b], providing approximation or exact algorithms for various versions of the prob-
lem. Regarding lower bounds, Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [PP11] show that computing the optimal deter-
ministic single-item auction is APX-hard, even for the case of 3 bidders. We remark that, if randomization
is allowed, this problem can be solved exactly in polynomial time via linear programming [DFK11]. In
very recent work, Daskalakis, Deckelbaum and Tzamos [DDT12a] show #P -hardness for computing the
optimal randomized mechanism for the case of additive buyers. We remark that their result does not have
any implication for the unit-demand case due to the very different structures of the two problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we first define formally the problem, state our
main results, and prove some preliminary basic properties. In Section 3 we show that the decision problem
is in NP. In Section 4 we give a polynomial-time algorithm for distributions with support size 2. Section 5
shows NP-hardness for the case of support size 3, and Section 6 for the case of identical distributions. We
conclude in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Problem Definition and Main Results
In our setting, there are one buyer and one seller with n items, indexed by [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The buyer is
interested in buying at most one item (unit demand), and her valuation of the items are drawn from n inde-
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pendent discrete distributions, one for each item. In particular, we use Vi = {vi,1, . . . , vi,|Vi|}, i ∈ [n], to
denote the support of the value distribution of item i, where 0 ≤ vi,1 < · · · < vi,|Vi|. We also use qi,j > 0,
j ∈ [|Vi|], to denote the probability of item i having value vi,j , with
∑
j qi,j = 1. Let V = ×ni=1Vi. We use
Pr[v] to denote the probability of the valuation vector being v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V , i.e., the product of qi,j’s
over i, j such that i ∈ [n] and vi = vi,j .
In the problem, all the n distributions, i.e., Vi and qi,j, are given to the seller explicitly. The seller then
assigns a price pi ≥ 0 to each item. Once the price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+ is fixed, the buyer draws
her values v = (v1, . . . , vn) from the n distributions independently, i.e., v ∈ V with probability Pr[v]. We
assume that the buyer is quasi-linear, i.e., her utility for item i equals vi − pi. Let
U(v,p) = maxi∈[n] (vi − pi) .
If U(v,p) ≥ 0, the buyer selects an item i ∈ [n] that maximizes her utility vi − pi, and the revenue of the
seller is pi. If U(v,p) < 0, the buyer does not select any item, and the revenue of the seller is 0.
Knowing the value distributions as well as the behavior of the buyer described above, the seller’s objec-
tive is to compute a price vector p ∈ Rn+ that maximizes the expected revenue
R(p) =
∑
i∈[n]
pi · Pr
[
buyer selects item i
]
.
We use ITEM-PRICING to denote the following decision problem: The input consists of n discrete distribu-
tions, with vi,j and qi,j all being rational and encoded in binary, and a rational number t ≥ 0. The problem
asks whether the supremum of the expected revenue R(p) over all price vectors p ∈ Rn+ is at least t, where
we use R+ to denote the set of nonnegative real numbers.
We note that the aforementioned decision problem is not well-defined without a tie-breaking rule, i.e.,
a rule that specifies which item the buyer selects when there are multiple items with maximum nonnegative
utility. Throughout the paper, we will use the following maximum price1 tie-breaking rule (which is conve-
nient for our arguments): when there are multiple items with maximum nonnegative utility, the buyer selects
the item with the smallest index among items with the highest price. (We note that the critical part is that an
item with the highest price is selected. Selecting the item with the smallest index among them is arbitrary —
and does not affect the revenue; however we need to make such a choice so that it makes sense to talk about
“the” item selected by the buyer in the proofs.) We show in Section 2.2 that our choice of the tie-breaking
rule does not affect the supremum of the expected revenue (hence, the complexity of the problem).
We are now ready to state our main results. First, we show in Section 3 that ITEM-PRICING is in NP.
Theorem 1. ITEM-PRICING is in NP.
Second, we present in Section 4 a polynomial-time algorithm for ITEM-PRICING when all the distribu-
tions have support size at most 2.
Theorem 2. ITEM-PRICING is in P when every distribution has support size at most 2.
As our main result, we resolve the computational complexity of the problem. We show that it is NP-hard
even when all distributions have support size at most 3 (Section 5), or when they are identical (Section 6).
Theorem 3. ITEM-PRICING is NP-hard even when every distribution has support size at most 3.
1It may also be called the maximum value tie-breaking rule, since an item with the maximum price among a set of items with
the same utility must also have the maximum value.
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Theorem 4. ITEM-PRICING is NP-hard even when the distributions are identical.
2.2 Tie-Breaking Rules
In this section, we show that the supremum of the expected revenue over p ∈ Rn+ is invariant to tie-breaking
rules. Formally, a tie-breaking rule is a mapping from the set of pairs (v,p) with U(v,p) ≥ 0 to an item k
such that vk − pk = U(v,p).
We will need some notation. Let B be the maximum price tie-breaking rule described earlier. We will
denote by R(p) the expected revenue of p under B, and by R(v,p) the seller’s revenue under B when the
valuation vector is v ∈ V . Given a price vector p and a valuation vector v ∈ V , we also denote by T (v,p)
the set of items with maximum nonnegative utility (so T (v,p) = ∅ iff U(v,p) < 0).
We show the following:
Lemma 2.1. The supremum of the expected revenue over p ∈ Rn+ is invariant to tie-breaking rules.
Proof. Let vi,j and qi,j denote the numbers that specify the distributions. Let B′ be a tie-breaking rule. We
will use R′(p) to denote the expected revenue of p under B′ and use R′(v,p) to denote the seller’s revenue
under B′ when the valuation vector is v ∈ V .
It is clear that for any p ∈ Rn+ and v ∈ V , we have R(v,p) ≥ R′(v,p) since B picks an item with the
highest price among those that maximize the utility. Hence, it follows that sup
p
R(p) ≥ sup
p
R′(p).
On the other hand, given any price vector p ∈ Rn+, we consider
pǫ =
(
max(0, p1 − r1ǫ), . . . ,max(0, pn − rnǫ)
)
∈ Rn+,
where ǫ > 0 and ri is the rank of pi sorted in increasing order (when there are ties, the item with the smaller
index is ranked higher). We claim that
lim
ǫ→0+
R′(pǫ) = R(p). (1)
It then follows from (1) that sup
p
R′(p) ≥ sup
p
R(p), which gives the proof of the lemma.
To prove (1), we show that the following holds for any valuation vector v ∈ V :
lim
ǫ→0+
R′(v,pǫ) = R(v,p). (2)
Observe that (1) follows from (2) since
R(p) =
∑
v∈V
R(v,p) · Pr[v] and R′(pǫ) =
∑
v∈V
R′(v,pǫ) · Pr[v].
To prove (2), we consider two cases. If U(v,p) < 0, then we have U(v,pǫ) < 0 when ǫ is sufficiently
small, and thus, R(v,p) = R′(v,pǫ) = 0. When U(v,p) ≥ 0, we make the following three observations.
First, the utility of an item i ∈ [n] under pǫ is at least as high as that under p. Second, if vi − pi > vj − pj
for some items i, j ∈ [n], then under pǫ the utility of item i remains strictly higher than that of item j, for ǫ
sufficiently small. Third, if vi − pi = vj − pj and pi > pj (in particular, pi > 0) for some i, j ∈ [n], then
under pǫ the utility of item i is strictly higher than that of item j when ǫ ≪ pi, as ri > rj . It follows from
these observations that when ǫ is sufficiently small, B′ must pick, given v and pǫ, an item k ∈ [n] such that
pk = R(v,p). (2) then follows from the definition of pǫ.
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We will henceforth always adopt the maximum price tie-breaking rule, and use R(v,p) to denote the
revenue of the seller with respect to this rule. One of the advantages of this rule is that the supremum of the
expected revenue R(p) is always achievable, so it makes sense to talk about whether p is optimal or not. In
the following example, we point out that this does not hold for general tie-breaking rules.
Example: Suppose item 1 has value 10 with probability 1, item 2 has value 8 with probability 1/2 and value
12 with probability 1/2, and in case of tie the buyer prefers item 1. The supremum in this example is 11: set
p1 = 10 for item 1 and p2 = 12− ǫ for item 2. The buyer will buy item 1 with probability 1/2 (if her value
for item 2 is 8) and item 2 with probability 1/2 (if her value for item 2 is 12). However, an expected revenue
of 11 is not achievable: if we give price 12 to item 2, then the buyer will always buy item 1 and the revenue
is 10. Note that the expected revenue for this tie-breaking rule is not a continuous function of the prices.
Before proving that the supremum is indeed always achievable under the maximum price rule, we start
by showing that without loss of generality, we may focus the search for an optimal price vector in the set
P = ×ni=1[ai, bi], where ai = minj vi,j and bi = maxj vi,j
denote the minimum and maximum values in the support Vi, respectively.
Lemma 2.2. For any price vector p ∈ Rn+, there exists a p′ ∈ P such that R(p′) ≥ R(p).
Proof. First, it is straightforward that no price pi should be above bi; if such a price exists, we can simply
replace it by bi and this will not decrease the expected revenue.
The non-trivial part is to argue that it is no loss of generality to assume that no price pi is below ai. Let
p ∈ ×ni=1[0, bi]. Suppose that there exists i ∈ [n] such that pi < ai, i.e., the set L(p) = {i ∈ [n] : pi < ai}
is nonempty; otherwise, there is nothing to prove.
Fix an i ∈ L(p) arbitrarily and let Si = {j ∈ [n] : pj < ai}. We consider the price vector p˜ defined by
p˜j = min{bj , ai} for j ∈ Si and p˜j = pj otherwise. As i ∈ Si, it follows that Si 6= ∅ and therefore p˜ 6= p
(in particular, p˜i = ai now). It is also clear that p˜ ∈ ×ni=1[0, bi]. It suffices to show that R(p˜) ≥ R(p).
Indeed, note that |L(p˜)| < |L(p)| so this process will terminate in at most n stages. After the last stage
we will obtain a vector p′ ∈ P whose expected revenue is lower bounded by all the previous ones.
To prove that R(p˜) ≥ R(p), we proceed as follows. Given any valuation vector v ∈ V , we compare
the revenue R(v,p) to R(v, p˜) and consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: On input (v,p), the item selected by the buyer is not from Si. We claim that the same item
is selected on input (v, p˜). Indeed, we did not decrease prices of items in Si, hence their utilities did
not go up, while the utilities of the remaining items did not change. Therefore, the revenue does not
change in this case, i.e., R(v, p˜) = R(v,p).
• Case 2: On input (v,p), the item selected is from Si. Then by the definition of Si, the revenue
R(v,p) we get is certainly less than ai. On input (v, p˜), we know that U(v, p˜) ≥ 0 (since item i
must have nonnegative utility, i.e., vi − p˜i = vi − ai ≥ 0) and thus, T (v, p˜) 6= ∅. We claim that
R(v, p˜) ≥ ai > R(v,p). To see this, we consider two sub-cases. If U(v, p˜) = 0, then we must
have i ∈ T (v, p˜) and the claim follows from our choice of the maximum price tie-breaking rule. If
U(v, p˜) > 0, then every j ∈ T (v, p˜) must satisfy p˜j ≥ ai; otherwise, by definition of p˜ we have
p˜j = bj and vj − p˜j ≤ 0, a contradiction. From p˜j ≥ ai and j ∈ T (v, p˜), we have R(v, p˜) ≥ ai.
The lemma follows by combining the two cases.
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Now we show that the supremum can always be achieved under the maximum price rule B.
Lemma 2.3. There exists a price vector p∗ ∈ P such that R(p∗) = sup
p
R(p).
Proof. By the compactness of P , it suffices to show that if a sequence of vectors {pi} approaches p, then
R(p) ≥ lim
i→∞
R(pi).
To this end, it suffices to show that, for any valuation vector v ∈ V ,
R(v,p) ≥ lim
i→∞
R(v,pi). (3)
Given any valuation v ∈ V , it is easy to check that T (v,pi) ⊆ T (v,p) when i is sufficiently large. (Again
consider two cases: U(v,p) < 0 and U(v,p) ≥ 0.) (3) then follows, since R(v,p) is the highest price of
all items in T (v,p) under the maximum price tie-breaking rule.
3 Membership in NP
In this section we prove Theorem 1, i.e., ITEM-PRICING is in NP.
Proof of Theorem 1. We start with some notation. Given a price vector p ∈ Rn+ and a valuation v ∈ V , let
I(v,p) ∈ [n] ∪ {nil} denote the item picked by the buyer under the maximum price tie-breaking rule, with
I(v,p) = nil iff U(v,p) < 0. We will partition P = ×ni=1[ai, bi] into equivalence classes so that two price
vectors p,p′ from the same class yield the same outcome for all valuations: I(v,p) = I(v,p′) for all v.
Consider the partition of P induced by the following set of hyperplanes. For each item i ∈ [n] and each
value si ∈ Vi, we have a hyperplane pi = si. For each pair of items i, j ∈ [n] and pair of values si ∈ Vi and
tj ∈ Vj , we have a hyperplane si − pi = tj − pj , i.e., pi − pj = si − tj . These hyperplanes partition our
search space P into polyhedral cells, where the points in each cell lie on the same side of each hyperplane
(either on the hyperplane or in one of the two open-halfspaces).
We claim that, for every valuation v ∈ V , all the vectors in each cell yield the same outcome. Consider
any cell C . It is defined by a set of equations and inequalities. Given any price vector p ∈ C and any value
si ∈ Vi, let V (p, si) be the set of valuation vectors v ∈ V such that vi = si and the buyer ends up buying
item i on (v,p). We claim that V (p, si) does not depend on p, i.e., it is the same set V (si) = V (p, si) over
all p ∈ C . To this end, first, if the points of C satisfy pi > si then V (p, si) = ∅. So suppose that C satisfies
p ≤ si. Consider any valuation vector v ∈ V with vi = si. The valuation v is in V (p, si) iff for all j 6= i,
we have si − pi ≥ vj − pj , and in case of equality we have si ≥ vj (iff pi ≥ pj due to the equality), and in
case of further equality si = vj we have i < j. Because all points of the cell C lie on the same side of each
hyperplane si − pi = vj − pj , it follows that V (p, si) does not depend on p. As a result, for any cell C and
any v ∈ V , all the points p ∈ C yield the same outcome I(v,p).
Next, we show that it is easy to compute the supremum of the expected revenue R(p) over p ∈ C , for
each cell C . To this end, let Wi = ∪si∈ViV (si) ⊆ V denote the set of valuations for which the buyer picks
item i if the prices lie in the cell C , and let γi be the probability of Wi: γi =
∑
v∈Wi
Pr[v]. It turns out that
γi can be computed efficiently, since the probability of V (si) can be computed efficiently as shown below
(and Wi is the disjoint union of V (si), si ∈ Vi).
Given si ∈ Vi, to compute the probability of V (si), we note that V (si) is actually the Cartesian product
of subsets of Vj , j ∈ [n]. For each j 6= i, we can determine efficiently the subset of values Lj ⊆ Vj such
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that the buyer prefers item i to j if i has value si and j has value from Lj . As a result, we have
V (si) = L1 × · · · × Li−1 × {si} × Li+1 × · · · × Ln,
and thus, we multiply the probabilities of these subsets Lj , for all j, and the probability of si. Summing up
the probabilities of V (si) over si ∈ Vi gives us γi, the probability of Wi.
Finally, the supremum of the expected revenue R(p) over all p ∈ C is the maximum of
∑
i∈[n] γi · pi
over all p in the closure of C . Let C ′ denote the closure of C; this is the polyhedron obtained by changing
all the strict inequalities of C into weak inequalities. The supremum of
∑
i γi · pi over all points p ∈ C can
be computed in polynomial time by solving the linear program that maximizes
∑
γi · pi subject to p ∈ C ′.
In fact, as we will show below after the proof of Theorem 1, that this LP has a special form: The question
of whether a set of equations and inequalities with respect to a set of hyperplanes of the form pi = si and
pi − pj = si − tj is consistent, i.e., defines a nonempty cell, can be formulated as a negative weight cycle
problem, and the optimal solution for a nonempty cell can be computed by solving a single-source shortest
path problem. It follows that the specification of a cell C in the partition is an appropriate yes certificate for
the decision problem ITEM-PRICING , and the theorem is proved.
Next we describe in more detail how to determine whether a set of equations and inequalities defines a
nonempty cell, and how to compute the optimal solution over a nonempty cell. The description of a (candi-
date) cell C consists of equations and inequalities specifying (1) for each item i, the relation of pi to every
value si ∈ Vi, and (2) for each pair of items i, j and each pair of values si ∈ Vi and tj ∈ Vj , the relation of
pi − pj to si − tj . Construct a weighted directed graph G = (N,E) over n + 1 nodes N = {0, 1, . . . , n}
where nodes 1, . . . , n correspond to the n items. For each inequality of the form pi < si or pi ≤ si, include
an edge (0, i) with weight si, and call the edge strict or weak accordingly as the inequality is strict or weak.
In fact, there is a tightest such inequality (i.e., with the smallest value si) since the cell is in P , and it suffices
to include the edge for this inequality only. Similarly, for each inequality of the form pi > si or pi ≥ si (or
only for the tightest such inequality, i.e. the one with the largest value si) include an edge (i, 0) with weight
−si. For each inequality of the form pi − pj < si − tj or pi − pj ≤ si − tj (or only for the tightest such
inequality) include a (strict or weak) edge (j, i) with weight si − tj . Similarly, for every inequality of the
form pi − pj > si − tj or pi − pj ≥ si − tj (or only for the tightest such inequality) include a (strict or
weak) edge (i, j) with weight tj − si.
We prove the following connections between G = (N,E) and the cell C:
Lemma 3.1. 1. A set of equations and inequalities defines a nonempty cell if and only if the corresponding
graph G does not contain a negative weight cycle or a zero weight cycle with a strict edge.
2. The supremum of the expected revenue for a nonempty cell is achieved by the price vector p that
consists of the distances from node 0 to the other nodes of the graph G.
Proof. 1. Considering node 0 as having an associated variable p0 with fixed value 0, the given set of equa-
tions (i.e., pairs of weak inequalities) and (strict) inequalities can be viewed as a set of difference constraints
on the variables (p0, p1, . . . , pn), and it is well known that the feasibility of such a set of constraints can be
formulated as a negative weight cycle problem. If there is a cycle with negative weight w, then adding all
the inequalities corresponding to the edges of the cycle yields the constraint 0 ≤ w (which is false); if there
is a cycle with zero weight but also a strict edge, then summing the inequalities yields 0 < 0.
Conversely, suppose that G does not contain a negative weight cycle or a zero weight cycle with a strict
edge. For each strict edge e, replace its weight w(e) by w′(e) = w(e)− ǫ for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 (we
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can treat ǫ symbolically), and let G(ǫ) be the resulting weighted graph. Note that G(ǫ) does not contain any
negative weight cycle, hence all shortest paths are well-defined in G(ǫ). Compute the shortest (minimum
weight) paths from node 0 to all the other nodes in G(ǫ), and let p(ǫ) be the vector of distances from 0. For
each edge (i, j) the distances pi(ǫ) and pj(ǫ) (where p0(ǫ) = 0) must satisfy pj(ǫ) ≤ pi(ǫ)+w′(i, j), hence
all the (weak and strict) inequalities are satisfied.
To determine if a set of equations and inequalities defines a nonempty cell, we can form the graph G(ǫ)
and test for the existence of a negative weight cycle using for example the Bellman-Ford algorithm.
2. Suppose that cell C specified by the constraints is nonempty. Then we claim that the vector p = p(0)
of distances from node 0 to the other nodes in the graph G is greater than or equal to any vector p′ ∈ C in
all coordinates. We can show this by induction on the depth of a node in the shortest path tree T of G rooted
at node 0. Letting p′0 = p0 = 0, the basis is trivial. For the induction step, consider a node j with parent i in
T . By the inductive hypothesis p′i ≤ pi. The edge (i, j) implies that p′j − p′i ≤ w(i, j) or < w(i, j), and the
presence of the edge (i, j) in the shortest path tree implies that pj = pi + w(i, j). Therefore, p′j ≤ pj .
The supremum of the expected revenue R(p′) over the cell C is given by the optimal value of the linear
program that maximizes
∑
i∈[n] γi ·p
′
i subject to p′ ∈ C ′, where C ′ is the closure of the cell C . Observe that
all the coefficients γi of the objective function are nonnegative, and clearly p is in the closure C ′. Therefore
p achieves the supremum of the expected revenue over C .
The NP characterization of ITEM-PRICING and the corresponding structural characterization of the
optimal price vector p = p(0) of each cell have several easy and useful consequences.
First, we get an alternative proof of Lemma 2.3 regarding the maximum tie-breaking rule:
Second Proof of Lemma 2.3. Suppose that the supremum of the expected revenue is achieved in cell C . Let
G be the corresponding graph, and let p be the price vector of the distances from node 0 to the other nodes.
If p ∈ C then the conclusion is immediate, so assume p /∈ C . From the proof of the above lemma we have
that p ≥ p′ coordinate-wise for all p′ ∈ C .
We claim that for any valuation v ∈ V , the revenue R(v,p) is at least as large as the revenue R(v,p′)
under any p′ ∈ C . Suppose that the buyer selects item i under v for prices p′. Then p′i ≤ vi and thus also
pi ≤ vi (since p is in the closure of C) and thus i is also eligible for selection under p. If the buyer selects i
under p then we know that pi ≥ p′i and the conclusion follows. Suppose that the buyer selects another item
j under p and that p′i > pj and hence pi > pj . Then we must have vj − pj > vi− pi due to the tie-breaking
rule. The facts that p is in the closure of C and vj−pj > vi−pi imply that vj−p′j > vi−p′i for all p′ ∈ C ,
and therefore the buyer should have picked j instead of i under prices p′, a contradiction.
We conclude that for any v ∈ V , R(v,p) ≥ R(v,p′) for any p′ ∈ C , and the lemma follows.
Another consequence suggested by the structural characterization of Lemma 3.1 is that the maximum of
expected revenue can always be achieved by a price vector p in which all prices pi are sums of a value and
differences between pairs of values of items. This implies for example the following useful corollary.
Corollary 3.1. If all the values in Vi, i ∈ [n], are integers, then there must exist an optimal price vector
p ∈ P with integer coordinates.
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4 A polynomial-time algorithm for support size 2
In this section, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the case that each distribution has support size at
most 2. In Section 4.1, we give a polynomial-time algorithm under a certain “non-degeneracy” assumption
on the values. In Section 4.2 we generalize this algorithm to handle the general case.
4.1 An Interesting Special case.
In this subsection, we assume that every item has support size 2, where Vi = {ai, bi} satisfies bi > ai > 0,
for all i ∈ [n]. Let qi : 0 < qi < 1 denote the probability of the value of item i being bi. For convenience, we
also let ti = bi − ai > 0. In addition, we assume in this subsection that the value-vectors a = (a1, . . . , an)
and b = (b1, . . . , bn) satisfy the following “non-degeneracy” assumption:
Non-degeneracy assumption: b1 < b2 < · · · < bn, ai 6= aj and ti 6= tj for all i, j ∈ [n].
As we show next in Section 4.2, this special case encapsulates the essential difficulty of the problem.
Let OPT denote the set of optimal price vectors in P = ×ni=1[ai, bi] that maximize the expected revenue
R(p). Next we prove a sequence of lemmas to show that, given a and b that satisfy all the conditions above
one can compute efficiently a set A ⊆ P of price vectors such that |A| = O(n2) and OPT ⊆ A. Hence, by
computing R(p) for all p ∈ A, we get both the maximum of expected revenue and an optimal price vector.
We start with the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. If p ∈ P satisfies pi > ai for all i ∈ [n], then either p = b or we have p /∈ OPT.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that p ∈ P satisfies pi > ai, for all i ∈ [n] but p 6= b. It then follows from
the maximum price tie-breaking rule that R(v,b) ≥ R(v,p) for all v ∈ V . Moreover, there is at least one
v∗ ∈ V such that R(v∗,b) > R(v∗,p): If pi < bi, then consider v∗ with v∗i = bi and v∗j = aj for all other
j. It follows that R(b) > R(p) as we assumed that 0 < qi < 1 for all i ∈ [n] and thus, p /∈ OPT.
Next we show that there can be at most one i such that pi = ai; otherwise p /∈ OPT. We emphasize that
all the conditions on Vi are assumed in the lemmas below, the non-degeneracy assumption in particular.
Lemma 4.2. If p ∈ P has more than one i ∈ [n] such that pi = ai, then we have p /∈ OPT.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that p ∈ P has more than one i such that pi = ai. We prove the lemma by
explicitly constructing a new price vector p′ ∈ P from p such that R(v,p′) ≥ R(v,p) for all v ∈ V and
R(v∗,p′) > R(v∗,p) for at least one v∗ ∈ V . This implies that R(p′) > R(p) and thus, p is not optimal.
We will be using this simple strategy in most of the proofs of this section.
Let k ∈ [n] denote the item with the smallest ak among all i ∈ [n] with pi = ai. By the non-degeneracy
assumption, k is unique. Recall that tk = bk − ak = bk − pk. We let S denote the set of i ∈ [n] such that
bi − pi = tk, so k ∈ S. By the non-degeneracy assumption again, we have pi > ai for all i ∈ S − {k}. We
now construct p′ ∈ P as follows: For each i ∈ [n], set p′i = pi if i /∈ S; otherwise set p′i = pi + ǫ for some
sufficiently small ǫ > 0. Next we show that R(v,p′) ≥ R(v,p) for all v ∈ V . Fix a v ∈ V . We consider
the following three cases:
1. If U(v,p) = tk, then T (v,p) ⊆ S by the definition of S. When ǫ is sufficiently small, we have
T (v,p′) = T (v,p) and R(v,p′) = R(v,p) + ǫ > R(v,p).
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2. If U(v,p) = 0 and k ∈ T (v,p), then we have T (v,p) ∩ S = {k} since bi > pi > ai for all other
i ∈ S. We claim that R(v,p) > pk in this case. To see this, note that there exists an item ℓ ∈ [n]
such that pℓ = aℓ and pℓ > pk by our choice of k. As U(v,p) = 0, we must have vℓ = aℓ and thus,
ℓ ∈ T (v,p) and R(v,p) ≥ pℓ is not obtained from selling item k. Therefore, we have
U(v,p′) = 0, T (v,p′) = T (v,p) − {k} and R(v,p′) = R(v,p).
3. Finally, if neither of the cases above happens, then we have T (v,p) ∩ S = ∅ (note that this includes
the case when T (v,p) = ∅). For this case we have T (v,p′) = T (v,p) and R(v,p′) = R(v,p).
The lemma then follows because in the second case above, we indeed showed that the following valua-
tion vector v∗ in V satisfies R(v∗,p′) > R(v∗,p): vk = bk and vi = ai for all i 6= k.
Lemma 4.2 reduces our search space to p such that either p = b or p ∈ Pk for some k ∈ [n], where we
use Pk to denote the set of price vectors p ∈ P such that pk = ak and pi > ai for all other i ∈ [n].
The next lemma further restricts our attention to p ∈ Pk such that pi ∈ {bi, bi − tk} for all i 6= k.
Lemma 4.3. If p ∈ Pk but pi /∈ {bi, bi − tk} for some i 6= k, then we have p /∈ OPT.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that pℓ /∈ {bℓ, bℓ − tk}. As p ∈ Pk, we also have pℓ > aℓ. Now we use S
to denote the set of all i ∈ [n] such that bi − pi = bℓ − pℓ. It is clear that k /∈ S. We use p′ to denote the
following new price vector: p′i = pi for all i /∈ S, and p′i = pi + ǫ for all i ∈ S, where ǫ > 0 is sufficiently
small. We use the same proof strategy to show that R(p′) > R(p). Fix any v ∈ V . We have
1. If U(v,p) < 0, then clearly U(v,p′) < 0 as well and thus, R(v,p′) = R(v,p) = 0.
2. If U(v,p) = bℓ − pℓ, then T (v,p) ⊆ S by the definition of S. When ǫ is sufficiently small,
T (v,p′) = T (v,p) and R(v,p′) = R(v,p) + ǫ > R(v,p).
3. If U(v,p) ≥ 0 but U(v,p) 6= bℓ − pℓ, then it is easy to see that T (v,p) ∩ S = ∅, because pi > ai
and bi − pi = bℓ − pℓ for all i ∈ S. It follows that T (v,p′) = T (v,p) and R(v,p′) = R(v,p).
The lemma follows by combining all three cases.
As suggested by Lemma 4.3, for each k ∈ [n], we use P ′k to denote the set of p ∈ Pk such that pk = ak
and pi ∈ {bi, bi − tk} for all other i. In particular, pi must be bi if ti < tk (ti 6= tk, by the non-degeneracy
assumption). The next lemma shows that we only need to consider p ∈ P ′k such that pi = bi for all i < k.
Lemma 4.4. If p ∈ P ′k satisfies pℓ = bℓ − tk > aℓ for some ℓ < k, then we have p /∈ OPT.
Proof. We construct p′ from p as follows. Let S denote the set of all i < k such that pi = bi − tk > ai. By
our assumption, S is nonempty. Then set p′i = pi for all i /∈ S and p′i = pi + ǫ for all i ∈ S, where ǫ > 0 is
sufficiently small. Similarly we show that R(p′) > R(p) by considering the following cases:
1. If U(v,p) = tk and T (v,p) ∩ S 6= ∅, we consider the following cases. If T (v,p) ⊆ S, then
T (v,p′) = T (v,p) and R(v,p′) = R(v,p) + ǫ > R(v,p).
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Otherwise, there exists a j ≥ k such that j ∈ T (v,p). This implies that R(v,p) ≥ pj = bj − tk is
not obtained from any item in S. As a result, T (v,p′) = T (v,p) − S and R(v,p′) = R(v,p).
2. If the case above does not happen, then we must have T (v,p) ∩ S = ∅ (this includes the case when
T (v,p) = ∅). As a result, we have T (v,p′) = T (v,p) and R(v,p′) = R(v,p).
The lemma follows by combining the two cases.
Finally, we use P ∗k for each k ∈ [n] to denote the set of p ∈ P such that pk = ak; pi = bi for all i < k;
pi = bi, for all i > k such that ti < tk; and pi ∈ {bi, bi − tk}, for all other i > k. However, P ∗k may still
be exponentially large in general. Let Tk denote the set of i > k such that ti > tk. Given p ∈ P ∗k , our last
lemma below implies that, if i is the smallest index in Tk such that pi = bi − tk, then pj = bj − tk for all
j ∈ Tk larger than i; otherwise p is not optimal. In other words, p has to be monotone in setting pj , j ∈ Tk,
to be bj − tk; otherwise p is not optimal. As a result, there are only O(n2) many price vectors that we need
to check, and the best one among them is optimal. We use A ⊆ ∪kP ∗k to denote this set of price vectors.
Lemma 4.5. Given k ∈ [n] and p ∈ P ∗k , if there exist two indices c, d ∈ Tk such that c < d, pc = bc − tk
but pd = bd, then we must have p /∈ OPT.
Proof. We use t to denote tk for convenience. Also we may assume, without loss of generality, that there is
no index between c and d in Tk; otherwise we can use it to replace either c or d, depending on its price.
We define two vectors from p. First, let p′ denote the vector obtained from p by replacing pd = bd by
p′d = bd − t. Let p
∗ denote the vector obtained from p by replacing pc = bc − t by p∗c = bc. In other words,
the cth and dth entries of p,p′,p∗ are (bc− t, bd), (bc− t, bd− t), (bc, bd), respectively, while all other n−2
entries are the same. Our plan is to show that if R(p) ≥ R(p′), then R(p∗) > R(p). This implies that p
cannot be optimal and the lemma follows.
We need some notation. Let V ′ denote the projection of V onto all but the cth and dth coordinates:
V ′ = ×i∈[n]−{c,d}Vi.
We use [n] − {c, d} to index entries of vectors u in V ′. Let U ⊆ V ′ denote the set of vectors u ∈ V ′ such
that ui − pi < t for all i > d. (This just means that for each i ∈ Tk, if i > d and pi = bi − t, then ui = ai.)
Given u ∈ V ′, vc ∈ {ac, bc} and vd ∈ {ad, bd}, we use (u, vc, vd) to denote a n-dimensional price vector in
V . Now we compare the expected revenue R(p), R(p′) and R(p∗).
First, we claim that, if v = (u, vc, vd) ∈ V but u /∈ U , then we have R(v,p) = R(v,p′) = R(v,p∗).
This is simply because there exists an item i > d such that vi − pi = t, so it always dominates both items c
and d. As a result, the difference among p,p′ and p∗ no longer matters. Second, it is easy to show that for
any v = (u, ac, ad) ∈ V , then R(v,p) = R(v,p′) = R(v,p∗) as the utility from c and d are negative.
Now we consider a vector v = (u, vc, vd) ∈ V such that u ∈ U and (vc, vd) is either (ac, bd), (bc, ad),
or (bc, bd). For convenience, for each u ∈ U we use u+1 to denote (u, ac, bd); u
+
2 to denote (u, bc, ad); and
u+3 to denote (u, bc, bd). By the definition of U , we have the following simple cases:
1. For p, we have R(u+2 ,p) = bc − t and R(u
+
3 ,p) = bc − t;
2. For p′, we have R(u+1 ,p′) = bd − t, R(u
+
2 ,p
′) = bc − t and R(u+3 ,p′) = bd − t.
We need the following equation:
R(u+1 ,p) = R(u
+
1 ,p
∗) = R(u+3 ,p
∗) (4)
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as well as the following two inequalities:
R(u+1 ,p
∗)− (bd − bc) ≤ R(u
+
2 ,p
∗) ≤ R(u+1 ,p
∗) (5)
Given a v ∈ V , recall that Pr[v] denotes the probability of the valuation vector being v. Given a u ∈ U ,
we also use Pr[u] to denote the probability of the n− 2 items, except items c and d, taking values u. Let
h1 = (1− qc)qd, h2 = qc(1− qd) and h3 = qcqd.
Clearly we have h1, h2, h3 > 0 and Pr[u+i ] = Pr[u] · hi, for all u ∈ U and i ∈ [3].
In order to compare R(p), R(p′) and R(p∗), we only need to compare the following three sums:∑
i∈[3]
∑
u∈U
Pr[u+i ] · R(u
+
i ,p),
∑
i∈[3]
∑
u∈U
Pr[u+i ] · R(u
+
i ,p
′) and
∑
i∈[3]
∑
u∈U
Pr[u+i ] · R(u
+
i ,p
∗).
For the first sum, we can rewrite it as (here all sums are over u ∈ U ):
h1 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · R(u+1 ,p) + h2 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · (bc − t) + h3 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · (bc − t), (6)
while the sum for R(p′) is the following:
h1 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · (bd − t) + h2 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · (bc − t) + h3 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · (bd − t). (7)
Since c < d and bc < bd, R(p) ≥ R(p′) would imply that∑
u
Pr[u] · R(u+1 ,p) >
∑
u
Pr[u] · (bd − t). (8)
On the other hand, we can also rewrite the sum for R(p∗) as
h1 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · R(u+1 ,p
∗) + h2 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · R(u+2 ,p
∗) + h3 ·
∑
u
Pr[u] · R(u+3 ,p
∗). (9)
The first sum in (9) is the same as that of (6). For the second sum, from (5), (4) and (8) we have∑
u
Pr[u] · R(u+2 ,p
∗) ≥
∑
u
Pr[u] ·
(
R(u+1 ,p)− (bd − bc)
)
>
∑
u
Pr[u] ·
(
bd − t− (bd − bc)
)
=
∑
u
Pr[u] · (bc − t).
The third sum in (9) is also strictly larger than that of (6) as R(u+3 ,p∗) = R(u+1 ,p∗) ≥ R(u+2 ,p∗) while
the second and third sums in (6) are the same, ignoring h2 and h3. Thus, R(p∗) > R(p).
4.2 General Case
Now we deal with the general case. Let I denote an input instance with n items, in which |Vi| ≤ 2 for all i.
For each i ∈ [n], either Vi = {ai, bi}where bi > ai ≥ 0, or Vi = {bi}, where bi ≥ 0. We let D ⊆ [n] denote
the set of i ∈ [n] such that |Vi| = 2. For each item i ∈ D, we use qi : 0 < qi < 1 to denote the probability of
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its value being bi. Each item i /∈ D has value bi with probability 1. As permuting the items does not affect
the maximum expected revenue, we may assume without loss of generality that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bn.
The idea is to perturb I (symbolically), so that the new instances satisfy all conditions described at the
beginning of the section, which we know how to solve efficiently. For this purpose, we define a new n-item
instance Iǫ from I for any ǫ > 0: For each i ∈ D, the support of item i is Vi,ǫ = {ai + iǫ, bi + 2iǫ}, and for
each i /∈ D, the support of item i is Vi,ǫ = {bi + iǫ, bi + 2iǫ}. For each i ∈ D, the probability of the value
being bi + 2iǫ is still set to be qi, while for each i /∈ D, the probability of the value being bi + 2iǫ is set to
be 1/2. In the rest of the section, we use R(p) and R(v,p) to denote the revenue with respect to I , and use
Rǫ(p) andRǫ(v,p) to denote the revenue with respect to Iǫ. Let Vǫ = ×ni=1Vi,ǫ. Let ρ denote the following
map from Vǫ to V : ρ maps u ∈ Vǫ to v ∈ V , where 1) vi = bi when i /∈ D; 2) vi = ai if ui = ai + iǫ and
vi = bi if ui = bi + 2iǫ when i ∈ D.
It is easy to verify that, when ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small, the new instance Iǫ satisfies all conditions given
at the beginning of the section, including the non-degeneracy assumption. Moreover, we show that
Lemma 4.6. The limit of maxpRǫ(p) exists as ǫ→ 0, and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Since Iǫ satisfies all the conditions, we know there is a set of O(n2) price vectors, denote by Aǫ for
Iǫ, such that the best vector in Aǫ is optimal for Iǫ and achieves maxpRǫ(p).
Furthermore, from the construction of Aǫ, we know that every vector pǫ in Aǫ has an explicit expression
in ǫ: each entry of pǫ is indeed an affine linear function of ǫ. As a result, the limit ofRǫ(pǫ) as ǫ approaches
0 exists and can be computed efficiently. Since limǫ→0 (maxpRǫ(p)) is just the maximum of these O(n2)
limits, it also exists and can be computed in polynomial time in the input size of I .
Finally, the next two lemmas show that this limit is exactly the maximum expected revenue of I .
Lemma 4.7. maxpR(p) ≤ limǫ→0
(
maxpRǫ(p)
)
.
Proof. Let p∗ denote an optimal price vector of I . It suffices to show that, when ǫ is sufficiently small,
maxpRǫ(p) ≥ R(p
∗)− 4n2ǫ. (10)
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2.1. Let p′ denote the vector in which p′i = max (0, p∗i − 4rinǫ),
where ri is the rank of p∗i among {p∗1, . . . , p∗n} sorted in the increasing order (when there are ties, items with
lower index are ranked higher). We claim that, when ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small,
Rǫ(u,p
′) ≥ R(ρ(u),p∗)− 4n2ǫ, for any u ∈ Vǫ, (11)
from which we get Rǫ(p′) ≥ R(p∗)− 4n2ǫ and (10) follows.
To prove (11) we fix a u ∈ Vǫ and let v = ρ(u) ∈ V . (11) holds trivially if R(v,p∗) = 0. Assume that
R(v,p∗) > 0, and let k denote the item selected in I on (v,p∗). (11) also holds trivially if p∗k < 4n2ǫ, so
without loss of generality, we assume that pk ≥ 4n2ǫ. For any other item j ∈ [n], we compare the utilities
of items k and j in Iǫ on (u,p′). We claim that
uk − p
′
k > uj − p
′
j (12)
because 1) if vk − p∗k > vj − p∗j , then (12) holds when ǫ is sufficiently small; 2) if vk − p∗k = vj − p∗j and
p∗k > p
∗
j , then (12) holds because p∗k − p′k − (p∗j − p′j) ≥ 4nǫ > (vk − uk) + (uj − vj); 3) finally, the case
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when vk − p∗k = vj − p∗j , pk = pj and k < j follows similarly from rk > rj . Therefore, k remains to be the
item being selected in Iǫ on (u,p′). (11) then follows from the fact that p′k ≥ p∗k − 4n2ǫ by definition.
Lemma 4.8. maxpR(p) ≥ limǫ→0
(
maxpRǫ(p)
)
.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 4.6, there is a price vector pǫ ∈ Aǫ in which every entry is an affine linear
function of ǫ, such that (as the cardinality of |Aǫ| is bounded from above by O(n2))
lim
ǫ→0
(
max
p
Rǫ(p)
)
= lim
ǫ→0
Rǫ(pǫ).
Let p˜ ∈ Rn+ denote the limit of pǫ, by simply removing all the ǫ’s in the affine linear functions. Moreover,
we note that |p˜i − pǫ,i | = O(nǫ) by the construction of Aǫ, where we use pǫ,i to denote the ith entry of pǫ.
Next, let qǫ denote the vector in which the ith entry qǫ,i = max(0, p˜i − rin2ǫ) for all i ∈ [n], where ri
is the rank of p˜i among entries of p˜ sorted in increasing order (again, when there are ties, items with lower
index are ranked higher). To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that, when ǫ is sufficiently small,
R(qǫ) ≥ Rǫ(pǫ)−O(n
3ǫ).
To this end, we show that for any vector u ∈ Vǫ with v = ρ(u),
R(v,qǫ) ≥ Rǫ(u,pǫ)−O(n
3ǫ). (13)
Finally we prove (13). First, we note that if U(v, p˜) < 0, thenR(v,qǫ) = Rǫ(u,pǫ) = 0 when ǫ > 0 is
sufficiently small (as u approaches v and pǫ, qǫ approach p˜). Otherwise, we have U(v,qǫ) > U(v, p˜) ≥ 0
and we use k to denote the item selected in I on (v,qǫ). To violate (13), the item selected in Iǫ on (u,pǫ)
must be an item ℓ different from k satisfying p˜ℓ > p˜k. Below we show that this cannot happen. Consider all
the cases: 1) if vk− p˜k < vℓ− p˜ℓ, we get a contradiction since item k is dominated by ℓ in I on (v,qǫ) when
ǫ is sufficiently small; 2) if vk − p˜k > vℓ − p˜ℓ, we get a contradiction with ℓ being selected in Iǫ on (u,pǫ)
when ǫ is sufficiently small; 3) if vk − p˜k = vℓ − p˜ℓ and p˜ℓ > p˜k, we conclude that vk − qǫ,k < vℓ − qǫ,ℓ,
contradicting again with k being selected in I on (v,qǫ). (13) follows by combining all these cases.
5 NP–hardness for support size 3
In this section, we give a polynomial-time reduction from PARTITION to ITEM-PRICING for distributions
with support (at most) 3. Recall that in the PARTITION problem [GJ79] we are given a set C = {c1, . . . , cn}
of n positive integers and wish to determine whether it is possible to partition C into two subsets with equal
sum. We may assume without loss of generality that c1 = max (c1, . . . , cn).
Given an instance of PARTITION, we construct an instance of ITEM-PRICING as follows. We have n
items. Each item i ∈ [n] can take 3 possible integer values 0, a, b, where b > a > 0, i.e., Vi = {0, a, b} for
all i ∈ [n]. Let qi = Pr[vi = b] and ri = Pr[vi = a]. We set qi = ci/M where M = 2nc31 and
ri =
b− a
a(1− ti)
· qi, where ti =
b
2a
·
∑
j 6=i,j∈[n]
qj .
The two parameters a and b should be thought of as universal constants (independent of the given instance
of PARTITION) throughout the proof. We will eventually set these constants to be a = 1, b = 3 (this choice
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is not necessary, there is flexibility in our proof and indeed any values with b > 2a will work). However, for
the sake of the presentation, we will keep a, b as generic parameters for most of the calculations till the end.
Note that the definition of ri implies that
bqi = a(qi + ri)− ariti. (14)
Let N = 2nc21. Then we have qi, ri = O(1/N) and ti = O(n/N) for all i. Thus, each distribution assigns
most of its probability mass to the point 0. This is a crucial property which allows us to get a handle on the
optimal revenue. For an arbitrary general instance of the pricing problem, the expected revenue is a highly
complex nonlinear function. The fact that most of the probability mass in our construction is concentrated at
0 implies that valuation vectors with many nonzero entries contribute very little to the expected revenue. As
we will argue, the revenue is approximated well by its 1st and 2nd order terms with respect to poly(n)/N ,
which essentially corresponds to the contribution of all valuations in which at most two items have nonzero
value. The probabilities qi, ri are chosen carefully so that the optimization of the expected revenue amounts
to a quadratic optimization problem, which achieves its maximum possible value when the given set C of
integers has a partition into two parts with equal sums.
Our main claim is that, for an appropriate value t∗, there exists a price vector with expected revenue at
least t∗ if and only if there exists a solution to the original instance of the Partition problem.
Before we proceed with the proof, we will need some notation. For T1, T2, ǫ ∈ R+ we write T1 = T2±ǫ
to denote that |T1 − T2| ≤ ǫ.
Note that, as both the qi’s and the ti’s are very small positive quantities, we have that ri ≈ (b− a)qi/a.
Formally, with the above notation we can write
ri =
b− a
a(1− ti)
· qi =
b− a
a
· qi ± 2
b− a
a
· qiti =
b− a
a
· qi ±O(n/N
2). (15)
Lemma 2.2 and Corollary 3.1 imply that a revenue maximizing price vector can be assumed to have non-
negative integer coefficients of magnitude at most b. The following lemma establishes the stronger statement
that, for our particular instance, an optimal price vector p can be assumed to have each pi in the set {a, b}.
Lemma 5.1. There is an optimal price vector p ∈ {a, b}n.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2 and Corollary 3.1, there is an optimal price vector with integer coordinates in [0 : b].
Let p be any (integer) vector in [0 : b]n that has at least one coordinate pj 6∈ {a, b}. We will show below
that R(p) < R(b), where b denotes the all-b vector, and hence p is not optimal.
Consider an index i ∈ [n] with pi > 0. The probability the buyer selects item i is bounded from above
by Pr[vi ≥ pi], the probability that item i has value at least pi, and is bounded from below by
Pr
[
vi ≥ pi
]
·
∏
j 6=i,j∈[n]
(1− qi − ri) ≥ Pr
[
vi ≥ pi
]
· (1−O(n/N)) .
Note that the second term in the LHS above is the probability that all items other than i have value 0 and the
inequality uses the fact that qi, ri = O(1/N). Applying these two bounds on p and b we obtain
R(b) ≥
∑
i∈[n]
qi (1−O(n/N)) · b and R(p) ≤
∑
i:pi>0
Pr
[
vi ≥ pi
]
· pi.
So R(b) ≥ (
∑
i∈[n] qib)−O(n
2/N2). Regarding R(p), we consider the following three cases. For i ∈ [n]
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with pi = b, the probability that vi ≥ pi is qi and the contribution of such an item to the second sum is qib.
Similarly, for i ∈ [n] with pi = a, the probability that vi ≥ pi is qi + ri and the contribution to the sum is
(qi + ri)a ≤ qib+O(n/N
2),
where the inequality follows from (15). Finally, we consider an item i ∈ [n] with pi /∈ {a, b}. If a < pi < b
then the contribution is qipi, which is at most qi(b − 1) = qib − qi, since pi is integer. If pi < a, then the
contribution is (qi+ ri)pi, which is at most (qi+ ri)(a− 1) = qib+ariti− qi− ri = qib− qi− ri(1−ati).
In both cases, the contribution to the sum is at most
qib− qi ≤ qib− (1/M).
Note that the definition of M and N implies that 1/M ≫ n2/N2. Because there exists at least one j with
pj /∈ {a, b}, it follows that R(p) < R(b) which completes the proof of the lemma.
As a result, to maximize the expected revenue it suffices to consider price vectors in {a, b}n. Given any
price-vector p ∈ {a, b}n, we let S = S(p) = {i ∈ [n] : pi = a} and T = T (p) = {i ∈ [n] : pi = b}. The
main idea of the proof is to establish an appropriate quadratic form approximation to the expected revenue
R(p) that is sufficiently accurate for the purposes of our reduction.
Approximating the Revenue. We appropriately partition the valuation space V into three events that yield
positive revenue. We then approximate the probability of each and its contribution to the expected revenue
up to, and including, 2nd order terms, i.e., terms of order O(poly(n)/N2), and we ignore 3rd order terms,
i.e., terms of order O(ǫ) where ǫ = n3/N3.
In particular, we consider the following disjoint events:
• First Event: E1 = {v ∈ V | ∃ i ∈ S : vi = b}.
Note that for any v ∈ E1 we have R(v,p) = a. The probability of this event is
Pr[E1] = 1−
∏
i∈S
(1− qi) =
∑
i∈S
qi −
∑
i 6=j∈S
qiqj ±O(ǫ).
• Second Event: E2 = E1 ∩ {v ∈ V | ∃ i ∈ S : vi = a and ∀ i ∈ T : vi ∈ {0, a}}.
Note that for any v ∈ E2 we have R(v,p) = a. The probability of this event is
Pr[E2] =
∏
j∈T
(1− qj)
[∏
i∈S
(1− qi)−
∏
i∈S
(1− qi − ri)
]
Using the elementary identities∏
j∈T
(1− qj) = 1−
∑
j∈T
qj +
∑
i 6=j∈T
qiqj ±O(ǫ)
∏
i∈S
(1− qi) = 1−
∑
i∈S
qi +
∑
i 6=j∈S
qiqj ±O(ǫ)
∏
i∈S
(1− qi − ri) = 1−
∑
i∈S
(qi + ri) +
∑
i 6=j∈S
(qi + ri)(qj + rj)±O(ǫ),
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we can write
Pr[E2] =
1−∑
j∈T
qj +
∑
i 6=j∈T
qiqj ±O(ǫ)
·
∑
i∈S
ri +
∑
i 6=j∈S
qiqj −
∑
i 6=j∈S
(qi + ri)(qj + rj)±O(ǫ)

=
∑
i∈S
ri −
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈T
qj +
∑
i 6=j∈S
qiqj −
∑
i 6=j∈S
(qi + ri)(qj + rj)±O(ǫ).
• Third Event: E3 = E1 ∩ {v ∈ V | ∃ i ∈ T : vi = b} .
Note that for any v ∈ E3 we have R(v,p) = b. The probability of this event is
Pr[E3] =
∏
i∈S
(1− qi)
1−∏
j∈T
(1− qj)

=
1−∑
i∈S
qi +
∑
i 6=j∈S
qiqj ±O(ǫ)
∑
j∈T
qj −
∑
i 6=j∈T
qiqj ±O(ǫ)

=
∑
j∈T
qj −
∑
i 6=j∈T
qiqj −
∑
i∈S
qi
∑
j∈T
qj ±O(ǫ).
Therefore, for the expected revenue R(p) we have:
R(p) =
(
Pr[E1] + Pr[E2]
)
· a+ Pr[E3] · b
= a ·
∑
i∈S
(qi + ri)−
∑
i 6=j∈S
(qi + ri)(qj + rj)−
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈T
qj

+ b ·
∑
j∈T
qj −
∑
i 6=j∈T
qiqj −
∑
i∈S
qi
∑
j∈T
qj
±O(ǫ).
Using (14) it follows that the first order term of the revenue is
b
∑
j∈T
qj + a
∑
i∈S
(qi + ri) = b
∑
j∈[n]
qj +
∑
i∈S
(
a(qi + ri)− bqi
)
= b
∑
j∈[n]
qj +
∑
i∈S
(ariti).
Observe that the first term b
∑
j∈[n] qj in the above expression is a constant L1, independent of the pricing
(i.e., the partition of the items into S and T ).
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In the second order term, we can rewrite the expression a
∑
i 6=j∈S(qi + ri)(qj + rj) as
1
2
·
∑
i∈S
(qi + ri)
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
a(qj + rj)
=
1
2
·
∑
i∈S
(qi + ri)
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
(bqj + arjtj)
=
b
2
·
∑
i∈S
qi
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj +
b
2
·
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj +
1
2
·
∑
i∈S
(qi + ri)
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
arjtj
= b
∑
i 6=j∈S
qiqj +
b
2
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj ±O(ǫ)
where in the first expression above, the double summation is multiplied by 1/2 because each unordered pair
i 6= j ∈ S is included twice. Thus, the second order term of the expected revenue R(p) is
− a
∑
i 6=j∈S
(qi + ri)(qj + rj)− a
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈T
qj − b
∑
i 6=j∈T
qiqj − b
∑
i∈S
qi
∑
j∈T
qj
= −b
∑
i 6=j∈S
qiqj −
b
2
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj − a
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈T
qj − b
∑
i 6=j∈T
qiqj − b
∑
i∈S
qi
∑
j∈T
qj ±O(ǫ)
= −b
∑
i 6=j∈[n]
qiqj −
b
2
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj − a
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈T
qj ±O(ǫ)
The first term in the last expression is a constant L2 independent of the pricing. As a result, we can rewrite
the second order term as follows:
L2 −
b
2
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj − a
∑
i∈S
ri
∑
j∈T
qj ±O(ǫ) = L2 −
∑
i∈S
ri
 b
2
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj + a
∑
j∈T
qj
±O(ǫ).
Summing with the fist order term and letting L = L1 + L2, we have:
R(p) = L+
∑
i∈S
ri
ati − b
2
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj − a
∑
j∈T
qj
±O(ǫ)
= L+
∑
i∈S
ri
 b
2
∑
j 6=i
qj −
b
2
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
qj − a
∑
j∈T
qj
±O(ǫ)
= L+
∑
i∈S
ri ·
(
b
2
− a
)∑
j∈T
qj ±O(ǫ)
= L+
b− a
a
·
(
b
2
− a
)
·
1
M2
·
∑
i∈S
ci ·
∑
j∈T
cj ±O(ǫ).
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Now setting a = 1, b = 3 in the previous expression, we have that for any p ∈ {a, b}n,
R(p) = L+
1
M2
(∑
i∈S
ci
)
·
∑
j∈T
cj
±O(ǫ). (16)
At this point, we observe that the sum of the two factors
∑
i∈S ci,
∑
j∈T cj in (16) is a constant (inde-
pendent of the partition). Thus, their product is maximized when they are equal. Because ǫ = o(1/M2), it
follows that the revenue is maximized when the product of the two factors is maximized. In particular, if
there exists a partition of the set C = {c1, . . . , cn} into two sets with equal sums H = (
∑
i∈[n] ci)/2, then
the corresponding partition of the indices into the sets S and T yields revenue L+ 1
M2
·H2 ±O(ǫ). On the
other hand, if there is no such equipartition of the set C , then for any partition of the indices, the revenue
will be at most L+ 1
M2
(H +1)(H − 1)±O(ǫ) = L+ 1
M2
(H2− 1)±O(ǫ). Since ǫ = o(1/M2) it follows
that there exists a partition of the set C = {c1, . . . , cn} into two sets with equal sums if and only if there
exists a price vector p ∈ {a, b}n with R(p) ≥ t∗ = L+ 1
M2
(H2 − 12). This completes the proof.
Remark. In the above construction, the support {0, a, b} of the distributions includes the value 0 (which in
fact has most of the probability mass). It is easy to modify the construction, if desired, so that the support
contains only positive values: shift all the values of the distributions up by 1 (thus, the supports now become
Vi = {1, 2, 4}) and add an additional (n+1)-th item which has value 1 with probability 1. This transforma-
tion increases the expected revenue by 1. It is easy to see that an optimal price vector p′ for the new instance
will give price p′n+1 = 1 to the (n+ 1)-th item and price p′i = pi + 1 to each other item i ∈ [n], where p is
an optimal vector for the original instance.
6 NP-hardness for identical distributions
In this section we show that ITEM-PRICING is NP-hard even for identical distributions. For this purpose we
reduce from the following (still NP-complete) version of Integer Knapsack.
Definition 6.1 (INTEGER KNAPSACK WITH REPETITIONS).
INPUT: n+ 1 positive integers a1 < · · · < an and L.
PROBLEM: Do there exist nonnegative integers x1, . . . , xn such that
∑
i∈[n] xi = n and
∑
i∈[n] xiai = L?
The NP-hardness of this version of Integer Knapsack is likely known in the literature, but for complete-
ness we include below a quick proof via a reduction from Subset-Sum.
Lemma 6.1. Integer Knapsack with repetitions is NP-hard.
Proof. Let b1 < · · · < bn and T denote an instance of Subset-Sum, where bi and T are all positive integers.
Without loss of generality, we assume that T > bn. Let K = n2T . For each i ∈ [n], set ai = Ki + bi and
ci = K
i
. Then one can show that {Kn+1, ai, ci : i ∈ [n]}, a set of 2n+ 1 positive integers, together with
L = T +K +K2 + · · ·+Kn + (n+ 1)Kn+1
form a yes-instance of the special Integer Knapsack problem iff a subset of {b1, . . . , bn} sums to T .
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6.1 Reduction
Let a1 < · · · < an and L denote an instance of INTEGER KNAPSACK WITH REPETITIONS. Without loss of
generality, we assume that L ≤ nan; otherwise the problem is trivial. Our goal is to construct a distribution
Q over nonnegative integers, and reduce the Integer Knapsack problem to the problem ITEM-PRICING with
n items, each of which has its value drawn from Q independently. The key idea is similar to the reduction for
support size 3. Q assigns most of its probability mass to the point 0, so that valuations with many nonzero
values contribute very little to the expected revenue. We set the support and probabilities of Q carefully, so
that the optimization of the expected revenue amounts to a quadratic optimization problem that mimics the
Integer Knapsack problem with repetitions.
We start the construction of Q with some parameters. Let m = max(n5, an), and let N = mn
2 denote
a large integer. For each i ∈ [n], let vi = mn+i. For each i ∈ [n− 1], let
γi =
1
N
(
1
mn+i
−
1
mn+i+1
)
=
m− 1
Nmn+i+1
.
Let γn = 1/(Nm2n). For convenience, we also let Γi =
∑n
j=i γj = 1/(Nm
n+i) for each i ∈ [n].
We record a property that follows directly from our choices of vi and γi.
Property 6.1. For each i ∈ [n], we have viΓi = 1/N .
Let now q1, . . . ,qn denote n probability distributions. They are closely related to the instance of Integer
Knapsack and will be specified later in this section. The support of each qi is a subset of [2n3] and for each
j ∈ [2n3], we use qi(j) to denote the probability of j in qi. Finally, let t1, . . . , tn denote a sequence of (not
necessarily positive) numbers, also to be specified later, with |ti| = O(1/N2) for all i ∈ [n].
We are ready to define Q using vi, γi, ti and qi. First, the support of Q is{
0, vi, vi + j : i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [2n3]
}
.
Note that all values in the support are bounded by O(m2n), and the size of the support is O(n4).
Next, Q has probability (γi/m) + ti at vi for each i ∈ [n]; probability qi(j) · γi(m− 1)/m at vi + j for
each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [2n3]; and probability 1− (
∑n
i=1 γi+ ti) at 0. It is easy to verify that Q is a probability
distribution since the probabilities sum to 1.
For convenience, we also let Ti =
∑n
j=i tj , and ri =
∑n
j=i(γj + tj) = Γi + Ti, for each i ∈ [n]. The
latter quantity, ri, is the probability that the value is at least vi.
Even though ti and qi have not been specified yet, we still can prove the following useful lemma about
optimal price vectors, as long as |ti| = O(1/N2) for each i ∈ [n]:
Lemma 6.2. There is an optimal price vector p ∈ {v1, . . . , vn}n.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2 and Corollary 3.1 there must be an (integral) optimal price vector in [0 : vn + 2n3]n.
Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ [0 : vn + 2n3]n be a price vector with p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn}n. We will prove below
that R(p) < R(b), where b is the vector in which all entries are vn. The lemma then follows.
For convenience, we use F (s) to denote the probability of a random variable drawn from the distribution
Q being at least s. For each index i ∈ [n] such that pi > 0, the probability that the buyer picks item i can be
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bounded from above by F (pi), and can be bounded from below by
F (pi) · (1− r1)
n−1 ≥ F (pi) ·
(
1−
1
mn+1N
−O
( n
N2
))n−1
≥ F (pi)−O
( n
m2n+2N2
)
,
where we used r1 = Γ1 + T1, Γ1 = 1/(mn+1N), T1 = O(n/N2) and F (pi) ≤ r1 = O(1/(mn+1N)) if
pi > 0. Applying the upper bound on R(p) and the lower bound on R(b), we have
R(p) ≤
∑
i:pi>0
F (pi) · pi and R(b) ≥ nvn
(
F (vn)−O
( n
m2n+2N2
))
≥ nvnF (vn)−O
(
n2
m2N2
)
.
We now examine piF (pi) and vnF (vn). We have three cases on sF (s):
Case 1: s = vi for some i ∈ [n]. Then we have
sF (s) = vi(Γi + Ti) =
1
N
±O
(
nm2n
N2
)
.
Case 2: s = vi + j for some i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [2n3]. We then have F (s) ≤ ri − (γi/m)− ti and
sF (s) ≤ (vi + 2n
3)
(
ri −
γi
m
− ti
)
=
1
N
·
m2 −m+ 1
m2
+O
(
n3
mn+1N
)
=
1
N
−Ω
(
1
mN
)
when i < n, and similarly when i = n,
sF (s) ≤ (vn + 2n
3) ·
γn(m− 1)
m
=
m− 1
m
·
1
N
+O
(
n3
m2nN
)
=
1
N
−Ω
(
1
mN
)
.
Case 3: Otherwise, let i ∈ [n] denote the smallest index such that s < vi. Then we have
sF (s) ≤ (vi − 1)ri = vi(Γi + Ti)− ri =
1
N
− Ω
(
1
m2nN
)
.
From Case 1, we have
R(b) ≥
n
N
−O
(
n2m2n
N2
)
.
Regarding R(p), combining all three cases, we have that
R(p) ≤
n
N
− Ω
(
1
m2nN
)
because there is at least one index i ∈ [n] such that pi /∈ {v1, . . . , vn} by the assumption. As N ≫ n2m4n,
we conclude that R(p) < R(b). The lemma then follows.
6.2 Analysis of the Expected Revenue
Given a price vector p ∈ {v1, . . . , vn}n, we let xi denote the number of items priced at vi. Then
∑
i xi = n.
We will only consider the contribution of two types of valuation vectors to the expected revenueR(p): those
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with exactly one positive entry and those with exactly two positive entries. The following lemma shows that
the total contribution from all other valuation vectors is of third order with respect to (roughly) 1/N .
Lemma 6.3. The revenue from valuation vectors with at least three positive entries is O(n3/(mn+3N3)).
Proof. The probability that a valuation vector has at least three positive entries can be bounded by
O(n3r31) = O
(
n3
m3n+3N3
)
.
Thus, the total contribution is at most O(m2n) ·O(n3r31), and the lemma follows.
Let ǫ = n3/(mn+3N3) in the rest of the section.
Next we examine valuation vectors with exactly one positive entry. Their total contribution is∑
i∈[n]
xiviri(1− r1)
n−1.
Since r1 = O(1/(mn+1N)) is of first order, approximating the sum up to second order yields∑
i∈[n]
xiviri(1− r1)
n−1 =
∑
i∈[n]
xiviri
(
1− (n− 1)r1 ±O(n
2r21)
)
=
∑
i∈[n]
xiviri − (n− 1)
∑
i∈[n]
xivirir1 ±O(ǫ). (17)
The contribution of valuation vectors with two positive entries is more involved. First, from those whose
two positive entries are over items of the same price, the total contribution to R(p) is
∑
i∈[n]
xi(xi − 1)
2
· vi
(
r21 − (r1 − ri)
2
)
(1− r1)
n−2. (18)
For each pair i < j ∈ [n], we use p(i, j) ∈ [0, 1] to denote the probability of α− vi > β − vj , where α and
β are drawn independently from Q conditioning on α ≥ vi and β ≥ vj . Using the p(i, j)’s, the contribution
from value vectors whose two positive entries are over items of different prices is∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj
(
viri(r1 − rj) + vjrj(r1 − ri) + rirj
(
vip(i, j) + vj
(
1− p(i, j)
)))
(1− r1)
n−2. (19)
Approximating to the second order, (18) can be simplified to
∑
i∈[n]
xi(xi − 1)
2
· vi(2rir1 − r
2
i )(1 ±O(nr1)) =
∑
i∈[n]
xi(xi − 1)virir1 −
∑
i∈[n]
xi(xi − 1)
2
· vir
2
i ±O(ǫ) (20)
and (19) can be simplified similarly to∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj
(
viri(r1 − rj) + vjrj(r1 − ri) + rirj
(
vip(i, j) + vj
(
1− p(i, j)
)))
±O(ǫ). (21)
Next we show that, for each i ∈ [n], all terms of virir1 in (17), (20) and (21) cancel each other. This is
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because the overall coefficient of virir1 is
−(n− 1)xi + xi(xi − 1) +
∑
j:j 6=i
xixj = −(n− 1)xi + nxi − xi = 0,
where the first equality uses the fact that
∑
j∈[n] xj = n. This allows us to further simplify the sum of (17),
(20) and (21), with an error of O(ǫ), to
∑
i∈[n]
xiviri −
∑
i∈[n]
xi(xi − 1)
2
· vir
2
i −
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixjrirj(vi + vj) +
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixjrirj
(
vip(i, j) + vj(1− p(i, j))
)
(22)
Note that, by Lemma 6.3, this is also an approximation of R(p), with an error of O(ǫ).
Let ǫ′ = n3mn−1/N3. By plugging in viri = vi(Γi + Ti) = (1/N) + viTi (note that Ti = O(n/N2) is
of second order), (22) can be further simplified to the following:
n
N
+
∑
i∈[n]
xiviTi −
∑
i∈[n]
xiri(xi − 1)
2N
−
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj(ri + rj)
N
+
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj
N
·
(
rjp(i, j) + ri(1− p(i, j))
)
±O(ǫ′).
Extracting xixj(ri + rj)/(2N) from the last sum above, we get
n
N
+
∑
i∈[n]
xiviTi −
∑
i∈[n]
xiri(xi − 1)
2N
−
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj(ri + rj)
2N
+
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj
N
·
(
(1/2) − p(i, j)
)
(ri − rj)±O(ǫ
′).
Also note that the second and third sums above can be combined into a linear form of the xi’s:
∑
i∈[n]
xiri(xi − 1) +
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj(ri + rj) = −
∑
i∈[n]
xiri +
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∑
i∈[n]
xiri
 = (n− 1)∑
i∈[n]
xiri.
As a result, we get the following approximation of the expected revenue R(p), with an error of O(ǫ′):
n
N
+
∑
i∈[n]
xiviTi −
n− 1
2N
∑
i∈[n]
xiri +
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj
N
·
(
(1/2) − p(i, j)
)
(Γi − Γj). (23)
Note that in (23), we also replaced ri − rj at the end with Γi − Γj since the error introduced is O(n3/N3).
6.3 Reverse Engineering of ti and p(i, j)
Our ultimate goal is to set ti’s and qi’s carefully so that (23) by the end has the following form:
n
N
+
L2
N2m3n
−
1
N2m3n
·
∑
i∈[n]
xiai − L
2 . (24)
Recall that L is the target integer in the Knapsack instance. If this is the case, then we obtain a polynomial-
time reduction from the special Knapsack problem to ITEM-PRICING, since the difference between (24) and
23
R(p) is at most O(ǫ′) and thus (24) is at least
n
N
+
L2
N2m3n
−
1
2N2m3n
if and only if a1, . . . , an and L is a yes-instance of the special Knapsack problem.
To compare (24) and (23), we use ∑i∈[n] xi = n in (24) and it becomes
n
N
−
1
N2m3n
·
∑
i∈[n]
x2i a
2
i + 2
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixjaiaj − 2
∑
i∈[n]
aiLxi

=
n
N
−
1
N2m3n
·
∑
i∈[n]
a2i xi
n− ∑
j:j 6=i
xj
+ 2 ∑
i<j∈[n]
xixjaiaj − 2
∑
i∈[n]
aiLxi

=
n
N
−
1
N2m3n
·
∑
i∈[n]
(na2i − 2aiL)xi −
∑
i<j∈[n]
xixj(ai − aj)
2
 (25)
By comparing (25) with (23), our goal is achieved if the following two conditions hold: First,
Ti =
1
vi
·
(
(n− 1)ri
2N
−
1
N2m3n
·
(
na2i − 2aiL
))
, (26)
for all i ∈ [n] (note that the absolute value of the right side of (26) is O(n/(m2n+2N2)); Second,
((1/2) − p(i, j))(Γi − Γj)
N
=
(ai − aj)
2
N2m3n
, for all pairs i < j ∈ [n]. (27)
For the first condition, we note that the equations (26) for all i ∈ [n] actually form a triangular system
of n equations in the n variables t1, . . . , tn, and thus there exists a unique sequence t1, . . . , tn such that (26)
holds for all i ∈ [n]. Moreover, as the absolute value of the right side of (26) is O(n/(m2n+2N2)), the ti’s
are O(1/N2) as we promised earlier. To see this, we let s denote the maximum of the absolute value of the
right side of (26), over all i ∈ [n]. Then one can show by induction on i that |ti| ≤ 2n−is for all i from n to
1. The claim now follows using 2n ≪ mn.
The second condition is more difficult to satisfy. From (27), we know that the condition is met if
1
2
− p(i, j) =
(ai − aj)
2
Nm3n(Γi − Γj)
, for all i < j ∈ [n]. (28)
We will define below the n distributions qi, i ∈ [n], so that their induced values for the probabilities p(i, j)
satisfy (28). An important property that we will need for the construction of the qi’s is that all the desired
probabilities p(i, j) are very close to 1/2. Specifically, using Γi − Γj ≥ γi ≥ γn = 1/(m2nN), we have
0 <
1
2
− p(i, j) ≤
(ai − aj)
2 ·Nm2n
Nm3n
= o
(
1
m
)
, (29)
since m = max(n5, an) and an = maxi∈[n] ai.
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6.4 Connecting p(i, j) with qi and qj
Fixing a pair i < j ∈ [n], we examine p(i, j) closer. Recall that p(i, j) is the probability of α− vi > β− vj
when α and β are drawn independently from Q, conditioning on α ≥ vi and β ≥ vj .
For convenience, we use block k to denote the subset {vk, vk + 1, . . . , vk + 2n3} of the support of Q.
Note that due to the exponential structure of the support of Q (and the assumption of i < j), if α is in block
k ≥ i and β is in block ℓ > j with ℓ > k then β − vj > α− vi. Therefore, for α− vi > β − vj to happen,
we only need to consider the following three cases:
Case 1: α is from block k and β is from block ℓ, where k, ℓ ∈ [n] satisfy k ≥ ℓ > j. Then the total
contribution of this case to probability p(i, j) is:
1
rirj
·
∑
k≥ℓ>j
(γk + tk)(γℓ + tℓ).
Case 2: α is from block k and β is from block j, where k > i. Then the total contribution is
1
rirj
·
∑
k>i
(γk + tk)(γj + tj).
Case 3: Finally, α is from block i and β is from block j, with α− vi > β − vj . Let q(i, j) denote the
probability of α > β, when α is drawn from qi and β is drawn from qj independently. Using q(i, j),
the total contribution of this case to p(i, j) is
1
rirj
·
((γj
m
+ tj
)
·
(m− 1)γi
m
+ q(i, j) ·
(m− 1)γi
m
·
(m− 1)γj
m
)
.
The probability p(i, j) is equal to the sum of the above three quantities for the three cases. Hence, q(i, j)
is uniquely determined by the p(i, j) we aim for, i.e., the unique p(i, j) that satisfies (28), because all other
parameters have been well defined by now, including t1, . . . , tn.
We show below that, if |p(i, j) − 1/2 | = o(1/m), then the q(i, j) it uniquely determines must satisfy
|q(i, j) − 1/2 | = O(1/m).
To see this, note first that since i < j ≤ n and ri = Γi + Ti = 1/(Nmn+i)±O(n/N2), we have that
γi =
m− 1
mn+i+1N
=
m− 1
m
· ri ±O
( n
N2
)
.
Thus,
∑
k>i(γk + tk) = ri − γi − ti = ri/m±O(n/N
2).
Using this fact in the above expressions for the three cases, it is easy to show that, other than
1
rirj
· q(i, j) ·
(m− 1)γi
m
·
(m− 1)γj
m
, (30)
the contribution of other terms is bounded from above byO(1/m) (note that k ≥ ℓ > j implies k > i). Since
|p(i, j) − 1/2 | = o(1/m), it follows that the term in (30) is between 1/2 − O(1/m) and 1/2 + O(1/m).
Note that γi = (m− 1)ri/m±O(n/N2) (since i < n), and γj is either (m− 1)rj/m±O(n/N2) if j < n
or rj ±O(n/N
2) if j = n. Therefore, the coefficient of q(i, j) in (30) is 1−O(1/m). Since the expression
in (30) is 1/2 ±O(1/m), it follows that |q(i, j) − 1/2| = O(1/m).
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6.5 Reverse Engineering of qi
Given q(i, j) for each pair i < j ∈ [n], our final technical step of the reduction is to construct a sequence of
probability distributions q1, . . . ,qn over [2n3] such that, for each pair i < j ∈ [n], the probability of α > β,
where α is drawn from qi and β is drawn from qj independently, is exactly q(i, j).
In general, such a sequence of distributions may not exist, e.g., consider n = 3, q(1, 2) = 1, q(2, 3) = 1
and q(1, 3) = 0. But here we are guaranteed that the q(i, j)’s are close to 1/2: |q(i, j) − 1/2| = O(1/m).
We shall show that in this case the desired distributions exist, and we can construct them.
To construct q1, . . . ,qn, we define
(
n
2
)
subsets of [2n3], called sections. Each section consists of 2n+3
consecutive integers. The first section is {1, . . . , 2n+3}, the second section is {2n+4, . . . , 4n+6}, and so
on and so forth. (Note that 2n3 is clearly large enough for (n2) sections.) Each section is labeled, arbitrarily,
by a distinct pair (i, j) with i < j ∈ [n]. We let ti,j,k denote the kth smallest integer in section (labeled)
(i, j), where k ∈ [2n+ 3]. Now we define qℓ, ℓ ∈ [n]. For each section (i, j), i < j ∈ [n], we have:
Case 1: If ℓ 6= i and ℓ 6= j, then we set
qℓ
(
ti,j,ℓ
)
= qℓ
(
ti,j,2n+4−ℓ
)
=
1
2
(
n
2
)
and qℓ
(
ti,j,k
)
= 0 for all other k ∈ [2n+ 3].
Case 2: If ℓ = j, then we set qℓ
(
ti,j,n+2
)
= 1/
(
n
2
)
and qℓ
(
ti,j,k
)
= 0 for all other k ∈ [2n+ 3].
Case 3: If ℓ = i, then we set
qℓ
(
ti,j,n+1
)
=
1
2
(
n
2
) − (n
2
)(
q(i, j) − 1/2
)
and qℓ
(
ti,j,n+3
)
=
1
2
(
n
2
) + (n
2
)(
q(i, j) − 1/2
)
,
and qℓ
(
ti,j,k
)
= 0 for all other k ∈ [2n+ 3].
This finishes the construction of q1, . . . ,qn. Using |q(i, j) − 1/2| = O(1/m) and m ≥ n5, we know that
q1, . . . ,qn are probability distributions: all entries are nonnegative and sum to 1.
It is also not hard to verify that the distributions satisfy the desired property, i.e., for each pair i < j ∈ [n]
the probability of α > β, where α is drawn from qi and β is drawn from qj independently, is exactly q(i, j).
First observe that every section of each distribution qi has the same probability 1/
(
n
2
)
. If α and β belong to
different sections then the order between α and β is determined by the order of the sections, and both orders
have obviously the same probability.
So suppose that α, β belong to the same section labeled (g, h), where g, h ∈ [2n+3]. If g 6= i or h 6= j,
then it is easy to check that both orders between α and β have the same probability. To see this, suppose first
that i 6∈ {g, h}. Then α = tg,h,i or tg,h,2n+4−i with equal probability. If α = tg,h,i, then α < β because β is
either tg,h,j or tg,h,2n+4−j (if j 6∈ {g, h}), or β = tg,h,n+2 (if h = j) or β = tg,h,n+1 or tg,h,n+3 (if g = j);
similarly, if α = tg,h,2n+4−i then α > β. Therefore, if i 6∈ {g, h}, then there is equal probability that α < β
and α > β. Similarly, the same is true if j 6∈ {g, h}.
Suppose that i ∈ {g, h} and j ∈ {g, h}. Since i < j and g < h, we must have i = g and j = h. In this
case, β = ti,j,n+2, and α = ti,j,n+1 or α = ti,j,n+3, hence α > β iff α = ti,j,n+3.
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The probability that α > β and α, β are not both in section (i, j) is
1
2
·
(
1−
1(
n
2
)2
)
.
The probability that α > β and α, β are both in section (i, j) is
1(
n
2
) ·( 1
2
(
n
2
) + (n
2
)(
q(i, j) −
1
2
))
=
1
2
(
n
2
)2 + (q(i, j) − 12
)
.
Thus, the total probability that α > β is exactly q(i, j) as desired.
This concludes the construction and the proof of the theorem.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the complexity of the Bayesian Unit-Demand Item-Pricing problem with indepen-
dent distributions. We showed that the decision problem is NP-complete even when the distributions are of
support size 3 or when they are identical. We also presented a polynomial-time algorithm for distributions
of support size 2.
Several interesting open questions remain. Is there a PTAS for general distributions? Note that our NP-
hardness results do not preclude the existence of an FPTAS. Actually, by adapting techniques from [CD11]
we can give an FPTAS for the case when the supports of the distributions are integers in a bounded interval.
Moreover, we conjecture that the IID case can be solved in polynomial time when the size of the support is
constant.
A related question concerns the complexity of the randomized case (i.e., lottery pricing). We conjecture
that this problem is intractable, but new ideas are needed to prove this.
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